ABSTRACT Wireless body area networks (WBANs) have to address jamming attacks to support healthcare applications. In this paper, we present a reinforcement learning-based power control scheme for the communication between the in-body sensors and the WBAN coordinator to resist jamming attacks. This scheme applies Q-learning to guide the coordinator to achieve an optimal power control strategy without being aware of the in-body sensor's transmission parameters and the WBAN model of the other sensors in the dynamic anti-jamming transmission. In addition, a transfer learning method is adopted to accelerate the learning speed. Stackelberg equilibria and their existence conditions are deduced in a single time slot to upper bound the performance of the learning-based sensor power control scheme. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can efficiently increase the utilities and decrease the transmission energy consumptions for the in-body sensors and the WBAN coordinator, and simultaneously reduce the attack possibility of the jammer compared with a standard Q-learning-based sensor power control scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile health (m-Health) equipments such as in-body sensors that monitor chronic illnesses and save life in emergency situations to meet clinical requirements and improve healthcare services especially for aging people [1] , [2] have security problems such as jamming attacks in wireless body area networks (WBANs) [3] - [5] . For instance, an insulin pump that is attacked over WBANs might stop working or change the dosage of drug-administration, and a hacked pacemaker or an implanted cardiac defibrillator might lead to heart failure. Although wireless security techniques have made significant progress, they are not well suited for m-Health systems. One reason for that is limited computational power, memory and battery life of the in-body sensors in these systems, the another reason is the transmission medium. In-body sensors use human tissue as the transmission medium to report the sensing data, which makes the utility of the receiver's data unpredictable due to the fact that the transmission parameters of tissue are different for different tissue geometries and properties and changes over time in WBANs [6] .
Jamming attacks are considered to be one of the major security problems in wireless communications due to their open access characteristics [7] , [8] . Power control is critical to save the power consumption and improve the network throughput against jamming attacks [9] . Game theory and neuro-fuzzy-based approaches have performed successfully in designing power-control algorithms. In recent years, reinforcement learning (RL) based power control algorithms such as [10] - [13] can achieve a better tradeoff between network utility and energy efficiency for wireless networks to resist smart jamming. However, to the best of our knowledge, the anti-jamming transmissions in WBANs have been rarely studied, especially the transmission between the in-body sensors and WBAN coordinator. In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission between in-body sensors such as ECG sensors, insulin pumps and EMG sensors and a WBAN coordinator such as a smart watch in a wireless body area network. As shown in Fig. 1 , the in-body sensors with limited computation resources and energy take charge of sensing physiological data and transmitting the sensing data to the WBAN coordinator who determines the transmission power of the in-body sensors. More specifically, the WBAN coordinator chooses a sensor to transmit in the next time slot and decides the transmission power for this sensor, and then sends the transmission power information to the sensor. The in-body transmission power policy has to save energy and improve the WBAN communication efficiency against jamming. Since the repeated in-body sensor power control process in a dynamic anti-jamming communication game can be viewed as a Markov decision process (MDP) [9] , the WBAN coordinator can use Q-learning, a model-free reinforcement algorithm to achieve the optimal power control policy in the dynamic game. We propose a hotbooting-Q-learning based in-body sensor power control scheme that uses transfer learning who initializes the Q-learning parameters with the experiences in similar scenarios to avoid random exploration at the beginning of learning. To examine the effectiveness of this power control scheme, we formulate a Stackelberg game to model the sequential interactions between the in-body sensor and the jammer in a WBAN, and deduce the Stackelberg equilibria (SEs) of the game to provide an upper bound of the in-body sensor power control performance under different WBAN conditions. Simulation results show that this hotbooting-Qlearning based in-body sensor power control scheme can converge to SEs after multiple time slots in the dynamic game. This scheme can efficiently increase the utility and decrease the energy consumption of the in-body sensors, and simultaneously decrease the attacker's jamming possibility.
The main contributions of this paper include the following: 1) We investigate secure transmission between in-body sensors and a WBAN coordinator outside the body, taking into consideration the body channel characteristics.
2) We formulate a reinforcement learning based power control strategy for in-body sensors to efficiently resist smart jamming attacks without being aware of the WBAN transmission parameters and the jamming models. In addition, hotbooting learning is used to accelerate the learning rate.
3) We formulate an anti-jamming communication game model for WBANs with different transmission paths and provide the SEs of the game to bound the performance of the power control scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related works are briefly reviewed, while in Section III, the system model is presented. We present a hotbooting-Q-learning based in-body sensor power control strategy in Section IV. In Section V, we present the antijamming in-body transmission Stackelberg game, and derive the Stackelberg equilibria of the game to evaluate the convergence performance of the power control scheme in the dynamic game. Simulations and conclusions are presented in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. RELATED WORKS
In WBANs, the energy efficiency and data security requirements are highlighted. In view of saving energy, a novel transmission power control (TPC) mechanism, named Proactive-TPC, was proposed in [14] , which combined closed-loop control with posture and motion detection to minimize energy waste and radio interferences. An accelerometer-assisted TPC scheme was proposed in [15] , which exploited the periodic fluctuations of link qualities to improve the transmission energy efficiency. The joint routing and power control scheme proposed in [16] aims at minimizing energy consumption under strong cross-technology interference while satisfying node reachability and delay constraints. The self-adaption scheme analyzed in [17] helps resource-constrained nodes enhance their performance by saving battery power and maintaining the quality of transmitted data. In this scheme, mutual information is used to estimate the temporal correlation, and reinforcement learning (RL) is used to estimate the appropriate active-sleep schedule for the sensor nodes to conserve battery power. The relay selection and power control scheme proposed in [18] uses a non-cooperative game to maximize the transmission energy efficiency under quality of service constraints in WBANs.
To solve the security problems, especially jamming problems, game theory has been used successfully. For instance, a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information was investigated in [19] to resist smart jamming attacks. The game-theoretic model of the interactions between a jammer and a communication node presented in [20] exploits a timing channel to improve resilience to jamming attacks, in which both the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium are provided. A set of deception-based defense strategies were proposed in [21] to protect the CRNs from the deceiving attack. Other works, such as wireless channel monitoring and anomaly detection schemes, were developed in [22] to protect medical devices.
As the channel condition is hard to estimate in wireless sensor networks, reinforcement learning techniques are effective for optimal power control decision making. Anti-jamming problems with discrete power strategies were investigated 37404 VOLUME 6, 2018 in [10] , in which a hierarchical power control algorithm (HPCA) based on Q-learning was proposed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. The anti-jamming underwater transmission framework presented in [11] applies deep Q-learning to control transmission power and uses transducer mobility to address jamming in underwater acoustic networks. An anti-jamming scheme was formulated in [12] based on a zero-sum game, and a Q-function-based approach was proposed to reduce the computation complexity.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. WBAN MODEL
A typical m-Health system as shown in Fig. 1 consists of a WBAN, a cotroller and a remote cloud server. Throughout this paper, we focus on the transmission security and the power consumption in the WBAN that is comprised of in-body sensors and a coordinator. The in-body sensors take the responsibility of physiological data collection, whereas the WBAN coordinator manages the transmission power control strategy against jamming. A single channel, with center frequency f 0 and bandwidth W , is assumed to be available for the transmission between the in-body sensors and the WBAN coordinator. For in-body sensors, communication is the main energy-consuming step in measurement and transmission tasks [17] . Thus, the sensors' energy saving requirements can be mainly deemed as transmission energy saving requirements. To save energy, the in-body sensors switch between sleep and awake modes. The details of the switching strategies in that process will be presented in our next work.
When the physiological data transmission of a in-body sensor is required, the sensor switches to the waken mode firstly, then transmits a request message including priority information to the WBAN coordinator. After that, it returns to the sleeping mode until an ACK message is received. Once the WBAN coordinator receives transmission request messages from the in-body sensors, it sets the transmission order according to the priority information. After the WBAN coordinator has identified an in-body sensor as the transmitter in the next time slot, it checks the transmission power of this selected in-body sensor and estimates the sensor's transmission parameters accordingly. It examines the bit error rate (BER) of the received message and estimates the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) based on the BER. Then, the energy consumption of the in-body sensor is observed by the WBAN coordinator. The utility of the in-body sensor is computed on the basis of the BER, the SINR and the energy consumption. According to the result, the WBAN coordinator formulates the power control strategy for the inbody sensor. Finally, the WBAN coordinator sends an ACK message with the transmission power strategy information to the in-body sensor. As an attack is detected, the WBAN coordinator will either ignore the request messages from the in-body sensors or manage the transmission power against the attack. To simplify the analysis process, the i − th in-body sensor is assumed to be chosen to take part in the transmission within the time slot k, and the indexes i and k are dropped when no confusion occurs.
B. JAMMING MODEL
In this paper, we formulate a jamming model based on reactive jamming. The reason is that reactive jamming is more powerful than other types of jamming [23] . Thus, the performance of the proposed anti-jamming algorithm in this scenario could be referenced as a lower limit for other types of scenarios.
To maximize the jammer's effectiveness and consume the energy of the in-body sensor and the WBAN coordinator, the reactive jammer, denoted by j, chooses jamming power y (k) at time slot k according to the network state, such as the transmission power of the in-body sensor and the WBAN coordinator and the energy consumption. The jamming power is constrained by 0 ≤ y (k) ≤ P j , where P j is the maximum transmission power of the jammer. E j is used to denote the transmission energy consumption of the jammer. d i,j denotes the distance between the jammer and the i−th inbody sensor, while h i,j represents the corresponding channel power gain.
C. CHANNEL MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , the WBAN coordinator is close enough to the body surface to make the transmission channel between in-body sensors and the WBAN coordinator an in-body channel. According to [24] , the in-body channel path loss can be calculated as
where d i,c is the distance between the i − th in-body sensor and the WBAN coordinator, PL 0[dB] is the reference path loss at distance d 0,c = 5mm, a is a fitting constant, n is the path loss exponent, which is based on the communication channel, and N is a random variable that is normally distributed with a mean of µ and a standard deviation of σ . For the parameters in function (1), refer to [24] . On the other hand, the path for the transmission between in-body sensors and the jammer is composed of an in-body channel and an in-air channel. The distance between the jammer and the body surface is assumed to be sufficiently larger than the distance between the in-body sensors and the body surface. Thus, the transmission channels between the inbody sensors and the jammer are just considered to be in-air channels.
The path loss of the in-air channel, with air as the transmission medium, is given by [25] 
where λ is the wavelength in meters, β is the path loss exponent, s is the shadow fading component, d 0,j is the reference distance, and d, which is the distance between the body surface and the jammer, is relative to d 0,j (= 1m). For ease of reference, the symbols and notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1 . 
IV. IN-BODY SENSOR POWER CONTROL SCHEME BASED ON RL
The repeated interactions between the in-body sensors and the jammer in WBAN can be modeled as a dynamic antijamming communication game, in which the in-body sensor power control strategy is decided by the WBAN coordinator according to channel states, BER and energy consumpition observed in previous time slot; whereas the jamming power is decided by the jammer based on the previous communication in WBAN. Given that the channel states in the next time slot are independent of their previous values, the power control process can be modeled as a finite Markov decision process (MDP). In addition, the channel state of each transmitter, especially for the in-body channels, is hard to estimate in every time slot [9] . Therefore, Q-learning, as a model-free RL algorithm, can be adopted to help the WBAN coordinator formulate a power control strategy without considering the channel states and the utility models of the other transmitters. Furthermore, to improve the convergence rate, a hotbooting technique [9] can be employed, from which the power control experiences in similar scenarios can be used to initialize the Q-table at the beginning stage of learning.
In the process of achieving an optimal power control strategy, each transmitter's goal is to maximize its instantaneous utility in every time slot in order to obtain the maximum long-term benefit. The instantaneous utility, denoted by u m , is mainly dependent on the SINR m , m ∈ {s, c, j}. Thus, we define the utility function as
where SINR m denotes the SINR of transmitter m, and E m denotes the observed energy consumption, m ∈ s, c, j.
Algorithm 1 Power Control Strategy of the In-Body Sensor
Formulated by the WBAN Coordinator Based on Hotbooting-
Choose transmission power for the in-body sensor, z (k) ∈ A s , based on the -greedy strategy; Tell the in-body sensor to transmit with power z (k) ; Receive message from the in-body sensor; Examine BER
End for First, we conduct several anti-jamming power control experiments in similar scenarios before learning, and the outputs constitute a Q-table, denoted by Q * , which is used to initialize the Q-table, denoted by Q, in Algorithm 1. Then, in time slot k, in-body sensor i is selected to transmit in the next time slot. After the WBAN coordinator receives a request message from the in-body sensor, it observes the sensor's transmission power z (k) , which is divided into L s levels, and then examines the BER 
Then, according to the state, the WBAN coordinator evaluates the in-body sensor's utility and chooses a transmission power from the in-body sensor's power selection sets, denoted by A s = [z] 1×L s , to obtain the maximum benefit in the next transmission. For the sake of simplifying the calculation, the transmission power is normalized by P s , which is the maximum transmission power of the in-body sensor; then, z will be constrained by z ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the power selection sets of the WBAN coordinator and the jammer are denoted by A c = [x] 1×L c and A j = [y] 1×L j , respectively. Also, they are constrained by x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1] after normalizing by P c and P j , respectively.
The Q-function of the in-body sensor can be expressed as in (7), which is used to update the Q-table to efficiently lead the WBAN coordinator towards the optimal transmission power for the in-body sensor.
where γ denotes the learning rate of the WBAN coordinator, and δ denotes the discount factor for the benefit of future transmission power. V (S s ) denotes the value function, which means that the optimal transmission power selected from A s is the maximum Q value in the in-body sensor's Q-table. The transmission power choosing strategy is based on the −greedy strategy [11] . The WBAN coordinator chooses a transmission power that can maximize the in-body sensor's Q function with a high probability, 1 − , while other powers have low probability, L c +1 , where ∈ (0, 1).
After iteration of the Q value, the optimal transmission power strategy of the in-body sensor will be obtained. The process is described by Algorithm 1.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To examine the effectiveness of the transmission power control scheme proposed above to resist smart jamming, we model a sequential interaction between the in-body sensor and the jammer in the WBAN as a Stackelberg game G. First, the in-body sensor sends a request message to the WBAN coordinator (the leader), and then, the coordinator as a vice leader determines the transmission power z (k) for the in-body sensor after having acquired the channel state and predicted the jamming power from the jamming history. On the other hand, the reactive jammer is ready to jam once the transmission initiated by the in-body sensor or the WBAN coordinator is sensed. The jamming power is also dependent on the channel state and the opponents' transmission power.
Assume that all the transmitters have the ability to freely adjust their personal transmission power and have perfect knowledge of the transmission parameters, such as the channel gains (h m ), the path loss (PL m ) models and the unit transmission energy consumptions of each other (e m ), m ∈ {s, c, j}. Then, on the basis of equations (3) ∼ (5), the utility function can be rewritten as
where η denotes the transmission noise, and it is assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the game is denoted by (z * , x * , y * ). This means that the optimal power control strategy of each transmitter is based on the condition that its opponents follow the SE strategy. (z * , x * ) are determined by the WBAN coordinator, while y * is determined by the jammer. Thus, the SE of game G is given by By (17) and (18) Remark: Being conscious of a jamming attack, the WBAN coordinator adjusts the transmission power to resist jamming. If the in-body sensor has low energy consumption, it will be informed to transmit with a specified power, as shown in (15a) and (15b), whereas the WBAN coordinator will stop transmitting if its transmission energy consumption is high. Once the transmission between the in-body sensor and the WBAN coordinator is sensed by the jammer, the jammer will launch an attack if the transmission noise is low, as shown in (15c). The transmission power is related to the channel conditions, as shown in (14) .
Theorem 2: The efficient power control game for secure transmission in WBANs has an SE:
If (24a) holds, then u s decreases with z, and
Thus, (11) holds for (23) . Similarly, by (9), ∀0 ≤ x ≤ P c , we have
If (24b) holds, then u c increases with x, and
Thus, (12) holds for (23) . By (10), ∀0 ≤ y ≤ P j , we have
where PL = PL c + PL s − PL j . Then,
and
Thus, the maximum value of u j is at Thus, (13) holds for (23) , and (0, P c , 0) is an SE of game G.
Remark: The in-body sensor will not be told to transmit if its transmission energy consumption is high, even if there is no jamming power, as shown in (24a), while the WBAN coordinator will transmit with maximum power if no jamming attack is detected and its transmission energy consumption is low, as shown in (24b). For the jammer, if its channel condition is not good enough, it will not attack, as shown in (24c).
Theorem 3: The efficient power control game for secure transmission in WBANs has an SE:
e c > h c η ,
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. Hence, we skip the analysis.
Remark:
The in-body sensor will transmit with maximum power if its transmission energy consumption is low. On the contrary, if the transmission energy consumptions of the WBAN coordinator and the jammer are high, they will keep silent to save energy, as shown in (33). Numerical results with d = 30, d i,c = 0.08, P s = 0.1, P c = 1, P j = 1, e s = 10, e c = 5, and e j = 20, with fixed h c = 0.5 and h j = 0.5 and with variable h s , which varies from 0.2 to 0.6, are shown in Fig. 2 . As expected, the SINR of the message transmitted from the in-body sensor increases with the channel power gain, while the BER decreases. This explains the fact that the power control strategies decided by the WBAN coordinator and the jammer are all based on the channel states, such as the channel power gain h m , the unit transmission energy consumption e m , m ∈ s, c, j, and the transmission noise η. The jammer only launches an attack when it has good channel state and the transmissions between the in-body sensors and the WBAN coordinator are detected. An in-body sensor with lower energy consumption has higher SINR and lower BER, as also shown in these plots. This is because the WBAN coordinator will keep silent when its energy consumption is relatively high and will allow the sensor to transmit to gain maximum utility.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results demonstrating the performance of the proposed power control scheme. We consider an in-body sensor that is at a depth of 80 mm from the body surface and is chosen to take part in a transmission event in the k − th time slot. Furthermore, considering the requirement of a high data transmission rate in WBANs [24] , an ultra-wide band (UWB) with a center frequency of 4.2 GHz is adopted. The parameters of the in-body channel model are chosen from Table 2 , which is referenced from [24] . To evaluate the performance of the proposed hotbooting-Q-learning power control scheme, the SINR, BER and utility are estimated in continuous time slots. For comparison, power control schemes based on traditional Q-learning and random selection are performed in the same scenario. Simulations are conducted with the maximum transmission power of P s = 0.1, P c = 1, and P j = 1 and distances of d = 30 and d i,c = 0.08.
From the plots shown in Fig. 3∼Fig . 5, it is easy to see that the learning based scheme has significantly better performance than the random selection based scheme. For instance, Fig. 3 shows the SINR of the three schemes, from which we can see that the SINR increases from 2.57 at the beginning to 3.81 in the RL-based strategy, which is approximately 65.7% higher than that in the random selection strategy, which fluctuates around 2.3. Moreover, the SINR in the RL-based strategy converges to nearly 4, that is, the SINR at the SE shown in Fig.2(a) , after multiple time slots, which illustrates the effectiveness of the learning based strategies. Fig. 4 displays the BER of the schemes, from which we can observe that the curves of BER decrease from 0.09 to 0.03 in the RL-based strategy, which is approximately 72.7% lower compared with the random selection strategy, whose value fluctuates around 0.11. This is in good agreement with the fact that the BER is decreasing with increasing SINR. Additionally, we can observe that the BER converges efficiently to a value at the SE, which is shown in Fig.2(b) . The investigation of the utility of each transmitter in different schemes is shown in Fig. 5 . This also shows the advantages of the RL-based strategies. In Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) , the utilities of the WBAN coordinator and the in-body sensor both increase by approximately 50% compared to the random selection strategy, whereas in Fig. Fig. 5(c) , the utility of the jammer decreases by approximately 3% compared to the random selection strategy. These results indicate that the increasing SINR and decreasing BER yield improvements to the utility, and the increasing utility of the in-body sensor and the WBAN coordinator results in the decreasing utility of the jammer.
Furthermore, from Fig. 3∼Fig . 5, we can see that the hotbooting-Q-learning based strategy has better performance than a traditional Q-learning based strategy. As shown in these plots, the hotbooting-Q-learning based strategy converges to the SE at approximately the 3000th time slot, which is faster than the value of 11000 in the traditional Q-learning based strategy. Additionally, the hotbooting-Q-learning based strategy will prompt the WBAN coordinator and the sensor to obtain higher long-term utilities than the other strategies, and at the same time, if the WBAN coordinator adopts hotbooting-Q-learning, the jammer's long-term utility will decrease dramatically compared to the other strategies.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the in-body sensor transmission in WBANs against jamming attacks and presented a hotbooting-Q-learning based power control scheme without the knowledge of the in-body transmission parameters and the game model. In particular, the use of a hotbooting technique accelerates the learning speed of Q-learning and improves the utilities of the in-body sensor and WBAN coordinator. We have formulated the interactions among the in-body sensor, the WBAN coordinator, and the jammer as a Stackelberg game, and derived the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game to evaluate the performance of the in-body sensors after convergence in the dynamic anti-jamming transmission game. Simulation results have shown the efficiency of the proposed in-body sensor power control scheme. For the future work, we will study the optimal transmission scheduling strategy among the in-body sensors for further energy saving. He serves as a PI for several research projects, including one sponsored by the International S&T Cooperation Program of China. In addition to publishing over 30 papers in leading international journals (including VLDBJ and TKDE) and top international conferences (including VLDB, SIGIR, ICDE, WWW, and ICDM), he has published two books and one book chapter, and wrote three U.S. patent applications (one granted) and three Chinese patent applications (one granted). His current research interests include data sciences and engineering, gerontechnology, mobile health technologies, health communication, and digital learning. He is an ACM Life Member.
